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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The section leader ordered us to take cover and open fire.  
There were seven of us, and seven or ten of the enemy.  I was 
too afraid to look, so I put my face in the ground and shot my 
gun up at the sky.  I was afraid their bullets would hit my 
head. . . . I was afraid that if I didn’t fire the section leader 
would punish me . . . The corporal beat the soldiers, the 
sergeant beat the corporal and sometimes the 2nd lieutenant 
beat the sergeant.  It’s always like that in the army. 
Khin Maung Than, age twelve1 
 
More child soldiers are reported to serve in the country known today as 
Myanmar,2 formerly Burma, than anywhere else in the world.3  The majority 
of these Burmese child soldiers are part of the national army, the Tatmadaw 
Kyi.4  Non-state opposition groups recruit children as well, though in smaller 
numbers.5  In recent years promising efforts have been made to squelch the 
practice of child soldiering.  Most notably, the signing of a Joint Action Plan 
on June 27, 2012 between the Government of Myanmar and the United 
Nations committed Myanmar to end and prevent the recruitment and use of 
children in the Tatmadaw.6  The Action Plan sets a timetable and measurable 
activities for the release and reintegration of children soldiers in the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MY GUN WAS AS TALL AS ME: CHILD SOLDIERS IN BURMA 2 
(2002). 
 2 The correct name to use for this country is a contentious point.  The country, originally 
known as the Union of Burma, had its name changed in 1989 by the military-led government 
to the Union of Myanmar for the purpose of lessening ethnic tensions.  This name change was 
not accepted by all political groups within the country.  For the purposes of this Note I will 
follow the lead of David I. Steinberg: Burma will be used when discussing all periods prior to 
1988, and Myanmar for all events after 1988.  Burma/Myanmar is used to indicate a 
continuity of action.  The term Burman will be used to refer to the majority ethnic group of the 
country, while Burmese will be used to refer to all citizens of the country, regardless of 
ethnicity.  See DAVID I. STEINBERG, BURMA/MYANMAR: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, at 
xxi (2010). 
 3 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 2. 
 4 The focus of this Note will primarily be on the use and recruitment of child soldiers by 
Myanmar’s armed forces, the Tatmadaw Kyi, which recruits the overwhelming majority of 
child soldiers.  See id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict 
in Myanmar, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. S/2013/258 (May 1, 2013) [hereinafter Secretary-General 
Country Report Myanmar 2013]. 
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government armed forces.7  Special Representative to the Secretary-General 
for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, stated in a news 
release, “This is an ambitious plan agreed by the Government and the United 
Nations to deal with this long standing issue, and the international 
community must support it.  This is a testament but also a test of Myanmar’s 
engagement for children.”8  
A political transformation occurred in Myanmar in 2010: a general 
election was held for the first time in twenty years, resulting in the 
establishment of a civilian government in 2011 under President Thein Sein.9  
The new government has advanced needed measures, such as the signing of 
the Joint Action Plan, to end the use and recruitment of children.10  Despite 
the positive steps taken since the country’s political transformation, it has 
been suggested that the issue is not receiving the attention it deserves.  
Richard Clarke, director of Child Soldier’s International, an independent 
human rights organization, stated, “Political reforms have led to some 
progress in the security and human rights situation in Myanmar . . . [but the] 
government and the international community need to ensure that protection 
of children in armed conflict is provided the highest priority in this reform 
agenda.”11 
The signing of the Joint Action Plan is an achievement in its own right for 
Myanmar, yet the Action Plan alone does not resolve the issue of ending the 
use of child soldiers.  The Action Plan expired by its own terms in December 
2013.12  It has been reported that the government of Myanmar is reviewing 
the potential extension of the plan.13  As a party to the plan, the government 
would have to agree to an extension in order for it to go into effect.  Given 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Press Release, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children 
and Armed Conflict, Myanmar Commits to Child-Free Armed Forces (June 27, 2012), 
available at http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/press-release/myanmar-commits-to-child-
free-armed-forces/ [hereinafter SRSG Press Release]. 
 8 U.N. and Myanmar Sign Plan to Prevent Child Recruitment in Armed Forces, U.N. NEWS 
CENTRE (June 27, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42333#.Uo18jGS 
xN6u. 
 9 See Timeline: Myanmar’s Reforms Under Civilian Government, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/14/us-myanmar-timeline-jdUSTRE79D197201 
11014. 
 10 See Chloe Gotterson, Myanmar’s Child Soldiers, SMALL WARS J. (Aug. 10, 2013), http:// 
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/myanmar%E2%80%99s-child-soldiers.   
 11 Rachel Vandenbrink, Burma Still Using Child Soldiers, RADIO FREE ASIA (Jan. 23, 
2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/child-soldiers-01232013180152.html. 
 12 See Aung Kyaw Zin, Myanmar Still Enlisting Child Soldiers: U.N. Working Group, 
MYANMAR FREEDOM DAILY, http://www.mmfreedom-daily.com/?p=12323 (last visited Jan. 
12, 2014). 
 13 Id. 
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the limited success of the Action Plan during its set eighteen-month time 
frame,14 an extension of the plan is essential.  The goals of the plan, the 
ending of the use of child soldiers and the subsequent delisting of the 
Tatmadaw Kyi from the U.N. Secretary-General reports, can only be realized 
when there is full compliance.  
Part II of this Note will discuss the ethnographic composition of 
Myanmar and will explore the history of Myanmar to illuminate why the use 
of child soldiers is so prevalent in the country, specifically focusing on the 
deeply rooted ideology of militaristic nationalism and the trend of interethnic 
tension.  Part III will focus on the phenomenon of child soldiering in modern 
day Myanmar.  Part IV will examine the international legal and institutional 
framework for the abolition of child soldiering, specifically focusing on the 
background of the U.N. Security Council’s involvement with the issue of 
child soldiering.  Part V will assess particular measures taken by the United 
Nations to end child soldiering in Myanmar, specifically examining the 
process of the U.N. Security Council.  Part VI of this Note will discuss the 
contents of the Joint Action Plan. Part VII of this Note will explore the 
measures necessary, principally the actualization of the Action Plan, to put a 
full and final stop on child soldiering in Myanmar. 
II.  BURMA/MYANMAR: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Ethnographic Composition 
Myanmar, formerly Burma, is located in Southeast Asia.15  Myanmar is 
the largest of the Southeast Asian mainland states and is roughly the size of 
the state of Texas.16  The population is 52.8 million, as reported by World 
Bank in 2012.17 
Myanmar is an ethnically diverse country with more than 135 different 
ethnic groups.18  The Burman are the largest ethnic group, comprising 69% 
of the population according to the most recent official census held in 1983.19  
Burmans are a powerful group controlling both the government and the 
                                                                                                                   
 14 See Secretary-General Country Report Myanmar 2013, supra note 6, ¶ 44. 
 15 Union of Myanmar/Burma, ONE WORLD NATIONS ONLINE, http://www.nationonline.org/ 
oneworld/Myanmar.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2014). 
 16 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxvi. 
 17 Myanmar Population, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/myanm 
ar/population (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
 18 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, OXFORD BURMA ALLIANCE, http://www.oxfordburmaallia 
nce.org/ethnic-groups.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
 19 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv.  
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military.20  The Burman people speak Burmese, the official language of the 
country and predominately practice the Theravada Buddhist religion.21 
The Karen people are one of the largest ethnic minorities in Myanmar, 
comprising 6.2% of the population.22  The religious makeup of the group is a 
combination of Buddhism, Animism, and Christianity, with the majority of 
the group practicing Buddhism and about 20% practicing Christianity.23   
Extreme tension exists between the Karen and the Burmans.  Fighting has 
been ongoing since the Karen sided with the Allied Forces in World War II 
in hopes of gaining independence from Burma.24  However, the Karen did 
not gain independence, and Karen State remained part of Burma following 
decolonization.25   The failure to gain independence led to an armed uprising 
by the Karen National Liberation Army, which began one of the longest 
running civil wars in history.26 
January 2012 produced hope that over sixty years of fighting between the 
Karen and the Tatmadaw would come to an end when a ceasefire agreement 
was signed between the Karen National Union and the Burmese 
government.27  However, the potential for peace was short-lived when 
allegations arose in March 2012 that the Tatmadaw breached the agreement 
by attacking frontline positions of the Karen National Union in the northern 
Karen State.28  Currently, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Karen is 
ongoing.29 
The Shan is a large ethnic minority in Myanmar, comprising 8.5% of the 
population.30  Most of the Shan people live in Shan State in eastern 
Myanmar.31  The majority of the Shan people practice Theravada Buddhism.32  
Shan State is home to ethnic armies, including the Shan State Army-South.33  
                                                                                                                   
 20 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
 21 Id.  
 22 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv. 
 23 ASHLEY SOUTH, BURMA’S LONGEST WAR ANATOMY OF THE KAREN CONFLICT 2 (Nick 
Bruxton ed., 2011), available at http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/Burma 
%27s%20Longest%20War.pdf. 
 24 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id.  
 28 Saw Yan Naing, Burmese Army Breaches Karen Ceasefire, IRRAWADDY (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=23211. 
 29 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
 30 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv. 
 31 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
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A ceasefire was signed between the Shan State Army-South and the Tatmadaw 
in December 2011, but ultimately broke down in February 2012.34  The 
Tatmadaw and other government authorities have reportedly subjected 
civilians in Shan State to numerous human rights violations, such as forced 
labor.35   
The Arakanese are an ethnic minority in Myanmar that comprises 
approximately 4.5% of the population.36  The Arakanese are predominantly 
Theravada Buddhists.37  The Arakanese are the largest ethnic group in 
Rakhine State, which is located in western Myanmar and extends along the 
Bay of Bengal.38  Rakhine State suffers from a severe lack of infrastructure, 
and a large proportion of the population—approximately 60%—is reportedly 
malnourished.39  Rakhine State has a history of striving for independence that 
predates the country’s colonization by the British.40  In the 1950s there was a 
movement that promoted the secession of Rakhine State from Burma; 
however, the movement was ultimately unsuccessful.41 
The Mon people comprise 2.4% of the population.42  The Mon people 
primarily live in Mon State located in southern Myanmar.43  The Mon are 
considered the first people to settle in Burma and the group has an ancient 
and rich culture that has had a major influence on the dominant Burmese 
culture.44  The Mon practice Theravada Buddhism, and are responsible for 
the spread of the religion throughout Burma.45  Following Burma’s 
independence, the Mon sought self-determination and were repressed by the 
Burmese regime. The tensions between the Mon and the government 
continued until 1996 when the groups entered into a ceasefire agreement.46   
The Chin ethnic group comprises 2.2% of the population.47  The Chin 
people mainly live in the Chin State located in Northwestern Myanmar.48  
Approximately 80%–90% of the Chin population is Christian, due to the 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv. 
 37 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv. 
 43 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv. 
 48 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
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influence of Baptist missionaries during British colonization.49  A minority 
of the Chin people adhere to traditional tribal beliefs that predate 
colonization, and the remaining portion of the population practices 
Theravada Buddhism.50  The Chin are one of the most persecuted minority 
groups in Myanmar,51 and are subjected to grave human rights violations by 
the Burmese government that are carried out in an effort to suppress the Chin 
minority.52  Food consumption in Chin State is believed to be the lowest in 
the country according to the United Nations World Food Program.53 
The Kachin people make up 1.4% of the population in Myanmar.54  The 
majority of the Kachin population resides in Kachin State located in 
northeastern Myanmar, while a smaller population resides in northern Shan 
State.55  Since the time of the British colonization, Christianity has been the 
predominate religion practiced by the Kachin.56  Following the country’s 
independence after colonization, the Kachin were subjected to discriminatory 
treatment by the Burmese government.  This discrimination led to the launch 
of a Kachin armed resistance movement comprised of the Kachin 
Independence Organization and its armed wing the Kachin Independence 
Army, one of the largest ethnic resistance forces in the country.57  In 1994, a 
ceasefire agreement was signed between the Kachin Independence 
Organization and the Tatmadaw.58  The fifteen-year agreement was broken in 
2009 when the Burmese government demanded that all ethnic ceasefire 
groups transform into Border Guard Forces subject to the control of the 
Tatmadaw.59  The Border Guard Forces were established in 2009 by the 
government of Myanmar and are comprised of former armed groups that 
have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government.60  The Border 
Guard Forces operate under the control of the Tatmadaw.61  The Kachin 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Sam Bagnall, Burma’s ‘Forgotten’ Chin People Suffer Abuse, BBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2010), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8626008.stm. 
 52 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
 53 Bagnall, supra note 51. 
 54 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv. 
 55 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, CHANCE FOR CHANGE 23 (2013) [hereinafter CHANCE FOR 
CHANGE], available at http://www.child-soldiers.org/research_report_reader.php?id =624. 
 61 Id. 
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Independence Army refused to join the Border Guard Forces and the 
Tatmadaw violently responded, thus breaking the ceasefire agreement.62 
Fighting between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups is ongoing in 
Myanmar, despite the establishment of a civilian government in 2011 and 
subsequent ceasefire agreements entered into between the government and 
certain minority groups, including the Mon and Arakan.63  These agreements 
are fragile,64 and years of internal conflict have resulted in wounded 
relationships that are not easily mended.  
B.  Ethnic Tensions and Militaristic Nationalism  
The long history of ethnic tension and militaristic nationalism in 
Burma/Myanmar provides insight into why the country has become a nation 
that engages in the egregious practice of child soldiering.65  The children of 
Burma/Myanmar, both past and present, have grown up surrounded by ethnic 
tensions and civil armed conflict.66  The pervasive presence of militaristic 
nationalism throughout the history of Burma/Myanmar has led the youth 
population to associate nationalist pride with participation in the armed 
forces.67  The divide that exists between the Tatmadaw and the smaller 
minority opposition groups illustrates the ethnic tensions ingrained in the 
country.68  Children raised in this type of politicized environment are easy 
prey to military factions that are trying to bolster their numbers at any cost.69 
In precolonial times, many Burmese communities were historically multi-
ethnic, and there were cultural and inter-ethnic exchanges between 
communities.70  Britain’s intrusion into Burma greatly disrupted this 
harmony, and the “divide and rule” fixed state approach of the British 
intensified ethnic divides.71  British colonization also initiated the trend of 
militaristic nationalism that is still ubiquitous in Myanmar today.72 
                                                                                                                   
 62 Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18. 
 63 See CHANCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 60, at 8. 
 64 Id. 
 65 RUTH CONSTANTINE, EXPLAINING CHILD SOLDIERING IN CONTEMPORARY BURMA 7 (2010), 
available at http://www.academia.edu/521739/Explaining_Child_Soldiering_in_Contemporary_ 
Burma. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 14. 
 68 See CONSTANTINE, supra note 65, at 23. 
 69 Id. at 30. 
 70 MARTIN SMITH & ANNE ALLSEBROOK, ANTI-SLAVERY INT’L, ETHIC GROUPS IN BURMA: 
DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (Anne-Marie Sharman ed., 2004). 
 71 Id.  But see STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 20. 
 72 CONSTANTINE, supra note 65, at 18. 
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The 1885 British colonization of Upper Burma set off a rebellion that 
pervaded many regions of the country by 1886.73  The British response to 
this eruption of violence was swift and brutish; any indigenous person caught 
pillaging or carrying firearms was shot, and villages suspected of resistance 
were burned.74  During the resistance the British ruled by martial law,75 
thereby setting the stage for the beginning of militaristic nationalism in 
Burma.  The indigenous people fought as nationalists in an effort to maintain 
control of their country, forging a link between nationalism and military 
force that would become, and remain, inextricable in the minds of many of 
the Burmese people.76  The British suppressed the rebellion by 1890, but 
maintained a military presence in the country.77       
Colonial rule brought changes to Burma that primarily benefited the 
British and disadvantaged the majority of the indigenous people.78  One of 
these changes was the Western notion of a fixed and bound state, a notion 
that led the British to quickly define territory within the country.79  The 
lowlands of Burma, traditionally ruled by monarchs and inhabited by 
Burmans, were taken over directly by the British.80  In contrast, the 
mountainous “frontier regions,” inhabited by indigenous ethnic minorities, 
were ruled indirectly by the British.81  The local authorities of the frontier 
regions, chiefs and headmen, were relied on to carry out administrative 
duties, yet the actual authority of these leaders was frozen.82  This 
imbalanced imposition of power resulted in differing reactions to British 
rule.83  The majority of the Burmese were resentful of British colonization.84   
However, the minority groups accepted British rule because lowland armies 
no longer came through the upland regions on war campaigns.85  The British 
also allowed missionaries to establish schools and hospitals throughout the 
country, including in the upland regions.86 
                                                                                                                   
 73 MARY P. CALLAHAN, MAKING ENEMIES: WAR AND STATE BUILDING IN BURMA 24–25 
(2003). 
 74 Id. at 25. 
 75 Id. at 24. 
 76 See CONSTANTINE, supra note 65, at 30.  
 77 CALLAHAN, supra note 73, at 26. 
 78 Id. at 23. 
 79 CHRISTINA FINK, LIVING SILENCE: BURMA UNDER MILITARY RULE 17 (2001). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 17–18. 
 84 Id. at 18. 
 85 FINK, supra note 79. 
 86 Id. 
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, the British attempted to 
centralize law enforcement administration by establishing a civilian police 
force.87  The inefficiency of the civilian force led the British to send in the 
military to handle all types of local criminal activity.88  This in turn set a 
quasi-custom for conflict resolution, “when local affairs get unruly, the state 
sends in the military.”89  
The eventual recruitment of indigenous minorities into the British 
military, to the exclusion of ethnic-majority Burmans, increased ethnic 
tensions between Burmans and ethnic minorities and fostered militarization 
by Burmans.90  The imbalance in recruitment signaled to the Burmans that 
the British’s policy was meant to segregate the races.91  Burmans reacted to 
non-recruitment by forming nationalist political organizations.92  
The Burman-led nationalist organizations formed armies, known as 
“tats.”93  Throughout the 1930s, various religious organizations, university 
student unions, and politicians formed their individual tats.94  The tats 
provided military training to persons who could not obtain such training 
elsewhere and led to the “Burmanization” of military terminology, 
institutions, and symbols.95  These “political pocket armies”96 illustrate the 
link that was strengthening between the mindset of nationalism and the 
military.  Further, the recruitment of youths, mainly students, into these 
organizations ensured that they, too, were associating participation in a 
military effort with the idea of nationalism. 
World War II only furthered distrust and division between ethnic groups.  
Burmans predominantly sided and fought with the Japanese.97  Most 
indigenous minorities, including the Karen, remained loyal to the British.98  
After the Allied forces ejected the Japanese from Burma, the British 
attempted to reinstate colonial rule.99  Burmese nationalists resisted by going 
on strikes, and the British, who no longer had the aid of Indian troops and 
                                                                                                                   
 87 CALLAHAN, supra note 73, at 29. 
 88 Id. at 30–31. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 35. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 35–36. 
 93 Id. at 36. 
 94 Id. at 36–37. 
 95 Id. at 36, 39. 
 96 Id. at 36. 
 97 Id. at 47–48. 
 98 SMITH, supra note 70, at 23. 
 99 FINK, supra note 79, at 21. 
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had insufficient funds to maintain their forces, eventually yielded.100  One of 
the stipulations placed on independence by the British was that of 
determining the political status of the ethnic minorities in the frontier 
areas.101  Due to ethnic tensions created during colonial rule and World War 
II, many ethnic leaders were hesitant to become part of the new state of 
Burma.102  
The visionary General Aung San, considered the father of modern 
Burmese independence,103 represented the hope of bridging the gap between 
the Burmans and ethnic minorities.104  Aung San reached out to non-
Burmans; among other things, he placed ethnic troops that had previously 
served under the British into the new army of Burma, appointed a Karen 
commander-in-chief to lead the new army, and selected ethnic minorities for 
high-ranking positions in the new government.105  Aung San also organized a 
multi-ethnic conference in 1947, the Panglong Conference, with the aim of 
devising a political structure to which both Burmans and minorities could 
agree.106   
The ethnic minorities’ fear of the British defaulting on their promise of 
independence caused the hasty drafting of a constitution for the new union.107  
The rushed process operated to disregard many ethnic minorities’ 
disagreements over boundary lines as well as their opposition to the new 
union, and this offset Aung San’s efforts to bring together the Burmans and 
ethnic minorities.108  This loss of momentum in unifying the indigenous 
population of Burma was further thwarted by the assassination of Aung San 
on July 19, 1947, six months before Burma gained independence on January 
4, 1948.109 
On their face, provisions within the constitution afforded rights to and 
disbursed power amongst ethnic minorities; in reality, however, these 
provisions gave very little to minority groups.110  Minorities held various 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 22. 
 103 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 42. 
 104 FINK, supra note 79, at 22. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 23. 
 107 Id. at 22. 
 108 Id. at 23. 
 109 Id. 
 110 STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 57.  
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positions within the government, but such positions were dictated by the 
“Burman rules,” the rules that represented the majority of the population.111  
Following the drafting of the constitution, Burma experienced a short-
lived democracy under the rule of Prime Minister U Nu.112  Insurgent armed 
groups sprang up during the time of the democracy, so that just one year after 
its establishment the democratic government was faced with rebellion by 
Karen forces.113  In 1958, the democratic government was replaced by a 
caretaker government led by General Ne Win.114  This temporary 
government achieved success in areas in which the democratic government 
had not.115  In a feeble attempt to restore democracy, elections were held in 
1960, and U Nu regained power.116  Again, there were several flaws in his 
leadership, including the institution of Buddhism as the official state religion, 
an act that displeased ethnic minorities.117   
In 1962, Ne Win staged a coup, overthrew the civilian government, and 
established a military government that reigned until 2010.118  Ne Win began 
military rule by establishing the Revolutionary Council as the head of the 
military regime.119  Military officials replaced civilian members of the 
administration, and military-guided Security Councils were established at all 
local levels.120  These Security Councils ripped away what little autonomy 
was left to the ethnic states.121 
In 1988, mass, nationwide peace demonstrations broke out.122  The 
military violently responded to the demonstrations, opening fire against the 
large groups of protesters.123 An estimated 3,000 people were killed.124  
Following the outbreak the government reformed into a military junta that 
called itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).125  In 
1990, the SLORC held elections; however, the SLORC refused to concede 
                                                                                                                   
 111 Id. 
 112 FINK, supra note 79, at 26–27. 
 113 Id. at 24. 
 114 Id. at 27–28. 
 115 Id.  
 116 Id. at 28. 
 117 Id.  
 118 FINK, supra note 79, at 29–30 (noting that the military government takeover was not 
difficult because “democracy was only superficially rooted in Burma”). 
 119 Id. at 32. 
 120 Id.  
 121 Id. 
 122 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 16. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
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power when opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, 
won for the National League of Democracy.126 
Elections were not held again for another twenty years.127  In 2010, 
general elections were held, and in March 2011 a civilian government was 
installed under President Thein Sein.128  Since then, the government has 
released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, entered into eleven ceasefire 
agreements with non-state armed groups, established a National Human 
Rights Commission, and relaxed press censorship.129  The government has 
also shown a willingness to enter into commitments such as the Joint Action 
Plan.130  
III.  CHILD SOLDIERS IN MYANMAR 
A.  History and Status of Child Soldiering in Myanmar 
Both the Tatmadaw Kyi and non-state opposition groups have been 
reported to engage in the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict.131  
The Tatmadaw is said to use and recruit children to a greater degree than all 
of the opposition groups combined.132  The exact number of child soldiers 
currently in the Tatmadaw and in non-state armed forces is difficult to 
estimate.133  Human Rights Watch provided a rough estimate in a 2002 
report, based on interviews with former Burmese child soldiers, that placed 
the number of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw at 70,000 and the total number 
in non-state armed groups at 6,000–7,000.134  Current estimates of the 
number of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw are often not given; rather, 
numbers of children released through the International Labor Organization’s 
forced labor complaint mechanism are referenced.135  A recent CBS article 
reported that, “Analysts say it’s unclear how many children are in Burma’s 
military.  About 500 boys have been discharged in the past few years,” 
followed by a statement by Steve Marshall, the International Labor 
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Organization’s Liaison Officer in Myanmar, describing that number as a 
“small proportion” of Myanmar’s total number of child soldiers.136 
Following the suppression of the nationwide democracy demonstrations 
of 1988, the military government, SLORC, began an ongoing initiative to 
modernize and expand the armed forces.137  This expansion marked the 
beginning of the widespread recruitment of children by the Tatmadaw.138   
Given the scant number of willing volunteers, this expansion has relied 
heavily on forced conscription.139  Children, particularly between the ages of 
twelve to seventeen years old, are especially vulnerable targets for forced 
recruitment into the armed forces.140  
In direct contrast to the practice of child recruitment by both the 
Tatmadaw and non-state armed groups, Myanmar national law, Directive 
No. 13/73 of the Myanmar Defense Services and War Office Council, 
prohibits the recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen years old.141  
Other laws of the country reach to the prohibition of child soldiering, albeit 
not as directly, such as section 374 of the Myanmar Penal Code, which 
criminalizes forced labor.142  Violation of the penal code section could result 
in up to twelve months of imprisonment, a fine, or both.143  
In 1993 Myanmar enacted the Child Law which penalizes offenses 
against children, including the abuse and threatening of children and the 
employment of children in hazardous or harmful work.144  Following the 
enactment of the Child Law, Myanmar formed the National Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, which serves as a coordinating body that monitors 
the implementation of the Child Law.145   
In January 2004, the State Peace and Development Council formed the 
Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage 
Children.146  The Committee’s Action Plan has three core objectives: to 
prevent the forced recruitment of underage children, to protect the interests 
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of underage children, and to ensure adherence to orders and instructions 
issued for the protection of underage children.147  Thein Sein, now the 
President of Myanmar, is the Chair of the Committee.148   
Democratic leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi has 
taken some action since her release from a fifteen-year-long house arrest in 
2010 to address child soldiering in Myanmar.  In 2010, Suu Kyi visited the 
International Labor Organization to discuss the needed investment in 
Myanmar to strengthen the country’s democracy.149  During her address she 
noted the ongoing relationship between her political party and the ILO on 
issues such as child soldiers: “[W]e cooperated to the best of our ability with 
the ILO and other interested organizations and individuals over the issue of 
forced labor and child soldiers.”150  
B.  The Experiences of Myanmar’s Child Soldiers 
Army camps abound throughout Myanmar.151  Many are located in non-
conflict areas.152  Camps in civilian areas function both to restrict the 
activities of the community and to make demands for forced labor and 
money.153  This constant military presence puts civilian children at risk for 
recruitment.154   
Reports of child recruitment have included voluntary enlistment, although 
many children say that they were forcibly recruited by threat or deception.155  
The Tatmadaw has certain common trends of recruitment including 
recruitment from streets and pagodas of poor and unaccompanied children.156  
There is also a practice of using “brokers” to recruit children.157  Brokers are 
tied to local commanders or recruitment officers and receive a fee for each 
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recruit they obtain.158  Brokers commonly lure children into recruitment with 
promises of food and shelter.159  The local police also play a role in forced 
recruitment.160  The police have been known to stop children who are not 
carrying national identification cards and have given them the “choice” of 
being put under arrest or joining the army.161  Children who have joined the 
armed forces voluntarily proffered the following reasons for enlisting: 
poverty, desire to join peers, avoidance of school, and troubles with family 
members.162  
Roles of children in the armed forces vary.  Children are sometimes used 
as porters and unarmed sentries.163  Other times, children have been made to 
walk in front of marching units in areas suspected of landmine 
contamination.164  It was reported in the U.N. Secretary-General’s 2013 
Report on Myanmar that children are known to be deployed to the frontline 
and partake in combat duties.165 
Children who attempt to escape from the armed forces are often captured 
and convicted of desertion; these convictions often result in prison terms 
lasting up to five years.166  International law prohibits the categorization of 
children as deserters when they have been illegally recruited into an armed 
group.167  Many children remain in armed groups and refugee camps, fearing 
that they will be arrested and imprisoned if they return to their 
communities.168 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
ABOLITION OF CHILD SOLDIERING 
Myanmar is a state party to four pertinent treaties that relate to the 
prohibition of child soldiering.  These treaties include the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,169 the International Labour Organization Forced Labor 
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Convention,170 the International Labor Organization Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention,171 and the U.N. Charter172—which in turn makes 
Myanmar subject to oversight by the U.N. Security Council.  
A.  Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the most widely 
accepted human rights treaty among the U.N. member states, with only two 
states having failed to ratify it.173  The CRC is the first international treaty to 
include the full range of human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, 
political, and social rights.174  The four core principles of the Convention are: 
non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the child; the right to 
life, survival, and development; and respect for the views of the child.175  By 
ratifying the CRC, a country agrees to undertake the responsibilities 
established by the Convention and to hold itself accountable for this 
commitment before the international community.176 
Myanmar ratified the CRC on July 16, 1991.177  By ratifying the 
Convention, Myanmar committed itself to protecting the rights of children, 
including the rights laid out in Article 38 of the CRC.178  Article 38 of the 
CRC reads: 
1.  States Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for 
rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in 
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child. 
2.  States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that 
persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not 
take a direct part in hostilities. 
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3.  States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who 
has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces.  
In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of 
fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen 
years, States Parties shall endeavor to give priority to those 
who are oldest. 
4.  In accordance with their obligations under international 
humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed 
conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to 
ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an 
armed conflict.179  
Reports of child soldiers under the age of fifteen in the Tatmadaw contradict 
Myanmar’s commitment under the CRC.  Further, the lack of age 
verification that takes place in recruitment180 suggests that Myanmar and the 
country’s armed forces are not taking the necessary steps to confirm age.  
This lack of age verification fails to give priority to the oldest youth—ages 
fifteen to eighteen—that voluntarily enlist in the armed forces.  
B.  International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention 
Myanmar ratified the International Labour Organization Forced Labour 
Convention on March 4, 1955.181  The Convention’s aim is to prohibit all 
forced and compulsory labor, aside from enumerated exceptions laid out in 
Article 2.182  The pertinent article of the Convention as it relates to the 
prohibition of child soldiering is Article 11, which defines individuals that 
can be required to engage in permitted forced or compulsory labor as “adult 
able-bodied males who are of an apparent age of not less than 18 and not 
more than 45 years.”183  Article 11 thus prohibits the use of persons under the 
age of eighteen for forced labor.  By ratifying the Convention, Myanmar 
committed to refraining from using children in forced labor.  The use of 
children soldiers under the age of eighteen who did not voluntarily enlist 
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qualifies as forced labor, thus its practice is in direct violation of the 
Convention.  
C.  International Labour Organization Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention 
On December 18, 2013, Myanmar ratified the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention.184  Article 3 of the Convention includes in its definition 
of the “worst forms of child labor” the “forced or compulsory recruitment of 
children for use in armed conflict.”185  The Convention requires signatories 
to immediately secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of 
child labor186 through the use of monitoring mechanisms187 and the 
implementation of action programs.188  Ratification of the Convention 
demonstrates that Myanmar recognizes that the forced recruitment of 
children into the military is egregious and that its elimination is essential.  
Due to the recent nature of Myanmar’s ratification it is yet to be determined 
if Myanmar will act in accordance with the Convention.  
D.  U.N. Security Council’s Involvement in the Issue of Children and Armed 
Conflict 
In 1996, the Graça Machel report on the “Impact of Armed Conflict on 
Children” was published, and ultimately led to major developments by the 
U.N. regarding children and armed conflict.189  The Machel Report focused 
on articulating an agenda for action by U.N. member states and the 
international community to improve the protection and care of children in 
armed conflict situations.190  The Machel Report spurred the U.N. General 
Assembly to call for the appointment of a Special Representative on the 
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Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.191  In 1998, Mr. Olara Otunnu was 
appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Children and 
Armed Conflict.192  In 1999, Mr. Otunnu presented the Security Council with 
information about the use of child soldiers.193  
The Special Representative’s findings led the Security Council to adopt 
significant resolutions pertaining to children and armed conflict.  In 1999, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1261 which stated that international law 
prohibits the use of children as soldiers and urged states to strengthen efforts 
to end the use and recruitment of children in armed conflict.194  Resolution 
1261 gave “full legitimacy” to placing the issue of the protection of children 
exposed to conflict on the agenda of the Security Council.195  The following 
year, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1314, which is notable for 
linking the mandatory power of the Security Council with the issue of 
children and armed conflict.196  In 2001, the Council adopted Resolution 
1379, which requested the Secretary-General attach a list to his future reports 
of parties to armed conflict, that were also on the Security Council’s agenda, 
that recruit or use children in violation of international obligations applicable 
to them under the U.N. Charter.197  The listing of violators of children’s 
rights has been utilized by the Secretary-General in each report since 2002.  
Resolution 1460, adopted in 2003, expanded the listing practice to include 
“parties to other armed conflicts that recruit or use children which are 
mentioned in the report.”  This resolution swept more broadly than 1379, to 
include parties that were not considered part of the Security Council’s 
agenda.198  
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Resolution 1539, adopted in 2004, expanded the protection afforded 
children in armed conflict in that it condemned additional violations against 
children.199  The listed violations would eventually become known as the 
“six grave violations,” and would subsequently become the foundation of the 
U.N. monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict.200  
Resolution 1539 asked the Secretary-General to devise an “action plan for a 
systematic and comprehensive monitoring and reporting mechanism.”201  
The Secretary-General complied with this request, and included such an 
action plan in his 2005 report on children and armed conflict.202   
In 2005, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1612, which called for 
the adoption of a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism for parties listed in 
Annex I of the Secretary-General’s reports.203  Resolution 1612 also 
established the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed 
Conflict.204  
The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism works through country task 
forces that are comprised of representatives from different U.N. bodies as 
well as representatives of non-governmental organizations.205  The country 
task forces monitor violations at the country level and then report to the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed 
Conflict.206  The Special Representative, with assistance from a U.N. 
committee, sends reports to the Secretary-General, who then presents them to 
the Security Council Working Group.207  The Working Group, composed of 
fifteen Security Council members, meets in closed sessions to review reports 
from the Secretary-General as well as progress made in the enactment of 
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action plans.208  At the close of these sessions, the Working Group renders 
conclusions that include recommendations to parties to conflict, to 
governments, and to U.N. actors on methods to foster the protection of 
children affected by armed conflict.209 
Despite the monitoring of the six grave violations, the majority of 
attention has been placed on one particular violation: the recruitment and use 
of children as soldiers.210  Commission of this violation is likely to lead to 
the listing of a party in annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report on 
this issue.211  
V.  THE UNITED NATIONS’ EFFORTS TO END CHILD SOLDIERING IN 
MYANMAR 
A.  U.N. Actions Pertaining to Children and Armed Conflict in Myanmar 
from 2000 to 2007: The Secretary-General’s Annual Reports 
The Secretary-General provides the Security Council’s Working Group 
on Children and Armed Conflict with an annual report that gives an 
overview of the situation of children in conflict zones and of child-protection 
measures.  The Secretary-General began issuing reports on children and 
armed conflict in 2000.212  Myanmar was not expressly mentioned in this 
first report,213 and was only briefly mentioned in the 2001 report.214  The 
2002 report contained a list of violating parties as requested under resolution 
1379.  But Myanmar was not included on this list; rather, Myanmar was 
discussed as an area that was not on the agenda of the Security Council.215  
The 2002 report noted that Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental 
organization, had reported that large numbers of children were forcibly 
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recruited into the Tatmadaw, and that UNICEF had confirmed the report.216  
Further, in 2002, the Secretary-General wrote about the recruitment of 
children by other non-state opposition groups.217 
The Secretary-General’s 2003 report briefly discussed Myanmar and 
stated that children were still being forcibly recruited by government armed 
forces.218  For the first time, the 2003 report included two annexes listing 
parties that committed the violation of recruiting and using children in armed 
conflict.219  Myanmar was included in Annex II, which pertained to “other 
parties” that were not on the Security Council’s agenda but that had been 
mentioned in the previous report.  Three Burmese groups were listed as 
committing the violation of recruitment and use of children in armed 
conflict.  Included were the government armed forces, the Tatmadaw Kyi, as 
well as two non-state opposition groups, the Karen National Union, and the 
Karenni National Liberation Army.220  
The Secretary-General did not issue a general annual report on children 
and armed conflict in 2004.  In his 2005 report, the Secretary-General 
included a section on developments in Myanmar.  For the first time, a report 
noted positive progress in Myanmar.  The Myanmar Government was 
reported to have concluded ceasefire agreements with seventeen armed 
groups, and in January 2004 the Government established the Committee for 
the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children.221  In October 
2004 the Committee developed a plan of action that provided for the 
discharge of children less than eighteen years of age from military service 
and for reintegration of those children back into their families and 
communities.222  Despite the improvements discussed, the report also 
mentioned the U.N. country team had reported the continued recruitment and 
use of children.223  Two offenders, the KNLA and KA, were reported not to 
have committed to ending the practice.224  Myanmar again was listed in 
                                                                                                                   
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 U.N. Secretary-General Report, Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/58/546-
S/2003/1053 (Nov. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report 2003]. 
 219 See S.C. Res. 1460, supra note 198, ¶ 16(a) (requesting the Secretary-General to include 
in his next report progress made by parties to other armed conflicts that recruit or use children 
which are mentioned in his previous reports, as distinct from parties listed in the Annex in 
accordance with Resolution 1379). 
 220 Secretary-General Report 2003, supra note 218, Annex II.  
 221 See Secretary-General Report 2005, supra note 202, ¶ 39. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 
 224 Id.  
2014] STOLEN INNOCENCE  209 
 
Annex II in the 2005 report,225 an indication that Myanmar was still not on 
the agenda of the Security Council.  
The Secretary-General’s 2006 report contained substantially more 
information regarding developments in Myanmar.  The report is especially 
notable because it is the first to provide the number of children recruited by 
the Tatmadaw, citing twelve “detailed and credible” allegations of forced 
recruitment since the beginning of 2005.226  This figure does not seem 
representative of the reality of child recruitment in the country, but it 
indicates progress in gaining reliable information regarding child 
recruitment.  The report stated that there was continued recruitment and 
training of children not only by the Tatmadaw, but also by non-state armed 
forces; it observed, however, that limitations on access made these reports 
difficult to verify.227  It later stated that a “fundamental problem” in 
Myanmar was the limitations put on the access of humanitarian actors to 
communities in conflict zones.228  The Government was said to have put 
these limitations in place for alleged “security reasons.”229  The Government 
continues to limit access to conflict zones, which hinders both the 
verification progress and the provision of humanitarian support.  Child 
Soldiers International reported in January 2013 that Myanmar was limiting 
the access of the U.N. and other humanitarian organizations to certain 
conflict-affected areas and contested regions of the country.230 
The developments section of the 2006 report also tracked the progress of 
Myanmar’s Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of 
Underage Children.  It noted that the Committee convened on February 3, 
2006 and was engaged in efforts to promote awareness among military 
establishments, training institutions, and local communities.231  It also stated 
that UNICEF and the Government had discussed the need to develop the 
Committee’s plan of action in order to prevent the recruitment of child 
soldiers.232  The report stated that the U.N. country team was aware that 
children had been released from the army, but was unable to verify the 
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effectiveness of the plan.233  The 2006 report was the first report in which 
Myanmar was listed in Annex I.234  This alteration would seem to indicate 
that Myanmar had been placed on the Working Group’s agenda, although the 
Secretary-General’s report in 2007 stated that Myanmar was not put on the 
Working Group’s agenda until April 2007.235 
B.  Myanmar’s Placement on the Working Group’s Agenda: The Secretary-
General’s Country Reports and the Working Group’s Conclusions 
The Secretary-General’s 2007 report was thus significant in that it both 
announced Myanmar’s addition to the Working Group’s agenda and stated 
that Myanmar had agreed to establish a monitoring and reporting mechanism 
in accordance with Resolution 1612.236  Despite these positive developments, 
the Secretary-General expressed continued concern regarding limited access 
to conflict-affected areas as a potential hindrance to the effective and 
independent functioning of the monitoring and reporting mechanism.237 
Once Myanmar was placed on the agenda of the Security Council’s 
Working Group, the Secretary-General began to issue country reports 
focused exclusively on children and armed conflict in Myanmar.  The three 
reports issued for the country thus far cover lengthy reporting periods 
spanning anywhere from a year and a half to over three years.  
The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict examines the 
Secretary-General’s country reports and adopts conclusions that are later 
issued as an official document of the Security Council.238  The conclusions 
include the Working Group’s reaction to the report, as well as 
recommendations to the Security Council, the government of Myanmar, and 
to the Secretary-General. 
The Secretary-General issued his first country report focused on children 
in armed conflict in Myanmar on November 16, 2007.239  The report covered 
the period of July 2005 through September 2007.240  The report commended 
the Government’s establishment of a formal monitoring and reporting 
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mechanism, in accordance with Resolution 1612, during the Special 
Representative Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy’s visit in June 2007.241  The 
Secretary-General reported that in September 2007 the Government 
established a working group for the mechanism.  In conjunction with the 
U.N. Country Task Force, that group was to engage in monitoring and 
reporting, in training on relevant laws, and in submitting allegations of child 
recruitment to the authorities. 
The 2007 report noted that the Government and the International Labor 
Organization had entered into a Supplementary Understanding establishing a 
complaint mechanism under which individuals can submit complaints of 
forced labor, including child recruitment, to an ILO liaison officer in 
Yangoon, the former capital of Burma.242  The ILO Forced Labour 
Convention was the treaty under which the Supplementary Understanding 
was formed.243  Since January 2013, the ILO has received 778 complaints 
and has prompted the successful release of 267 child soldiers.244 
Despite the progress of the Government, the Secretary-General expressed 
trepidation in his 2007 report about the limited access to locations of 
concern.245 Access to those locations is vital in order to monitor the 
implementation of mechanisms as well as verify efforts purportedly taken by 
the Government to end recruitment.246  In the portion of the report centered 
upon the recruitment and use of children by armed groups, incidents and 
trends tied to continued recruitment were discussed, including the pressure 
for the Tatmadaw to accelerate recruitment, patterns in underage recruitment, 
and age verification issues.247  Likely due to the restrictions placed on access, 
the report only discussed three verified cases of child recruitment by the 
Tatmadaw.248  Further, despite the Government Committee’s presentation of 
reports to the U.N. on awareness raising programs and information on 
released children, the Secretary-General noted that “to date cooperation on 
concrete action remains very limited,” due to the inability of the U.N. to 
confirm any of these actions because of access restrictions.249 
The Secretary-General’s first report commended the positive steps taken 
by the Government of Myanmar while retaining a stern stance that further 
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measures were required to achieve the end of recruitment.  The Working 
Group’s conclusions to the report recommended that the Government 
increase public awareness about child soldiering, allow access for the 
Country Task Force where illegal recruitment had been reported, and 
prosecute persons found responsible for the illegal recruitment of children.250  
The Secretary-General issued the second country report in 2009, fewer 
than two years after the issuance of the first report.  The second report 
addressed positive initiatives undertaken by the Government during the 
reporting period.  These initiatives included: the detection and release of 
seventy-six children in military schools; the implementation of procedures to 
aid in the rehabilitation and reintegration of children released from the armed 
forces; and the dismissal of nine military officials found to have engaged in 
illegal recruiting.251  Although he lauded the initiatives, the Secretary-
General stressed that the Government’s actions could not be verified due to 
continued restricted access to contested areas.252  Additionally, the Secretary-
General expressed disapproval of the Government’s reliance on the ILO 
complaint mechanism as the sole means of obtaining reports of illegal child 
recruitment and urged an expanded, more developed monitoring program.253 
The Secretary-General’s report identified core issues restraining the U.N., 
including restricted access, the lack of security measures for victims and 
witnesses who report illegal recruitment, and the absence of an agreed action 
plan.254  The second report placed particular emphasis on the necessity of an 
action plan to close the gap between the policy of ending child recruitment 
and its actual application.255   
The report noted discussions that took place between the U.N. Country 
Task Force and the Government on the development and implementation of 
an action plan, and the submission of a draft action plan to the 
Government.256  The highlighted components of the action plan included 
independent access for the U.N. to recruitment centers and camps, reporting 
and verification of compliance, access to non-state actors to facilitate 
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dialogue for action plans, and assurance of the safety of monitors and 
witnesses.257  Despite the discussions with the Government’s monitoring and 
reporting, the U.N. Country Task Force had not yet been able to discuss the 
action plan formally with the Government’s high-level committee.258 
The Working Group’s conclusions to the second country report indicated 
that a meeting eventually did take place between the U.N. Country Task 
Force and the government high-level committee on August 2009, a few 
months after the Secretary-General’s 2009 report had been issued.259  The 
Working Group encouraged the finalization of the action plan in its 
recommendations to the government of Myanmar.260  The conclusions also 
urged the Government to facilitate access for the U.N. Country Task Force, 
to increase accountability for persons found to recruit children illegally, and 
to expand the ILO complaint mechanism.261 
The Secretary-General’s third, and most recent, country report was issued 
on May 1, 2013.262  The report covered the longest reporting period to date: 
three years and nine months.  During the third reporting period, substantial 
changes occurred in Myanmar, including the establishment of a civilian-led 
administration in March 2011 under President Thein Sein.  The third report 
noted progress made by the new government, including discussion with non-
state armed groups, which resulted in ceasefire agreements with ten of the 
country’s eleven ethnic groups.263  The report also expressed appreciation for 
Sein’s efforts to lead a peace-building and reconciliation process by 
establishing peacemaking committees.264  Despite the positive change in the 
legal landscape, however, the report pointed out that access restrictions 
remained and continued to impede the monitoring and reporting functions of 
the group during the reporting period.265 
Notwithstanding the positive actions undertaken by the Government in 
accordance with the country’s laws and military directives, the Tatmadaw 
reportedly continued to recruit children during the third reporting period.266  
However, the ILO complaint mechanism reported 802 cases of underage 
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recruitment, 770 of these complaints were verified.267  The increased number 
of complaints filed each year between 2009 and 2012 indicated greater 
public awareness of the complaint mechanism.268  As of December 2012, the 
Country Task Force had been told that the Tatmadaw had released 448 
recruits, and that the number of children recruited each year from 2009 to 
2012 decreased.269 
The third country report was especially significant in that it reported the 
signing of an action plan between the government of Myanmar and the U.N. 
Country Task Force.  For many years, both the Secretary-General and the 
Working Group had encouraged the action plan.270  The signing of the plan 
symbolized the hope that the gap between the policy of ending child 
recruitment and application would finally be filled.  
VI.  THE JOINT ACTION PLAN 
After six years of negotiations, on June 27, 2012, the government of 
Myanmar and the U.N.  Country Task Force signed a Joint Action Plan to 
end and prevent the recruitment and use of children in the Tatmadaw, 
including the integrated Border Guard Forces.271  The Action Plan was 
negotiated under Resolution 1612.272  The Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, the Myanmar Minister of Defense Hla Min, and high-
ranking officers of the Myanmar armed forces were present at the signing of 
the plan in Myanmar’s capital, Nay Pyi Taw.273   
The press release issued by the U.N. regarding the action plan provided 
little information regarding the plan’s substance, stating only that “the action 
plan sets a timetable and measurable activities for the release and 
reintegration of children associated with Government armed forces, and for 
the prevention of further recruitment.”274  In fact, the Action Plan is not a 
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public document.275  Action plans entered into between the United Nations 
and parties to armed conflict are not made public unless the listed party 
chooses to make the document public.276  As can be seen from the Action 
Plan in Myanmar, the signing of such plans is typically widely reported,277 
but the disclosure of the contents of the actual action plan seems only to have 
extended to senior-level officials in the Tatmadaw.278 
Despite the nonpublic nature of the Action Plan, much can be gleaned 
about the substance of the plan from the Secretary-General’s third country 
report on Myanmar.  The 2013 report stated that the Action Plan contains a 
set of commitments to be pursued by the Government of Myanmar and the 
U.N. Country Task Force over an initial eighteen-month period.279  The 
commitments included the systematic identification, registration, and release 
of all children under the age of eighteen who were recruited and used in the 
Tatmadaw; the reintegration of such children back into their communities; 
the strengthening of recruitment procedures to ensure the prevention of 
further child recruitment by the Tatmadaw; the raising of public awareness 
on how to prevent underage recruitment; training and capacity-building for 
the Tatmadaw on international human rights, including child protection; and 
the strengthening of disciplinary actions against persons found to participate 
in underage recruitment.280  The commitments explicitly listed in the report 
likely do not provide a comprehensive description of the plan, but they, 
along with other information included in the Secretary-General’s report, 
provide valuable insight into the goals of the plan.   
Following the June 2012 signing of the Action Plan, the Tatmadaw 
appointed a senior liaison officer to oversee the plan’s implementation.281  At 
the time the Secretary-General’s third report was issued in May 2013, efforts 
to implement the Action Plan included the development of detailed 
operational procedures for identifying, verifying, and discharging children 
recruited or present in the armed forces.282  
In September 2012, the Tatmadaw reported that trainings on the Action 
Plan had been carried out at military focal points in each regional command, 
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and forty-two children had been discharged from the Tatmadaw at a 
ceremony in Yangon.283  The Tatmadaw also reportedly issued instructions 
on the implementation of the action plan and made materials on the plan to 
distribute to military personnel.284   
The ILO complaint mechanism, established in 2007, has worked in 
conjunction with the Action Plan.285  In October 2012, the Country Task 
Force submitted twenty-five cases of underage recruitment, received through 
the complaints mechanism, to the Tatmadaw senior liaison officer.286  By 
December 2012, the Tatmadaw identified twenty-four child recruits and 
discharged them in February 2013.287   
The Secretary-General’s 2013 report expressed optimism that the slow 
start and low numbers during the first six months of the Action Plan would 
increase in the following months once the new identification process was 
implemented in all military units, the Country Task Force was granted access 
to operational regiments of the military, and materials on the Action Plan 
were dispersed among the Tatmadaw and general public.288  
The ubiquitous problem of restricted access was still a noted concern.  
The 2013 report explicitly stated that access for the Country Task Force to 
“military bases, prisons and other places where children may be present” was 
stipulated in the Action Plan for purposes of monitoring and verifying the 
implementation of the plan.289  Despite this commitment, in December 2012 
the Tatmadaw had notified the Country Task Force that access to operational 
regiments would be subject to their consideration.290  As of January 2013, the 
Country Task Force was only permitted access to regional commands, 
recruitment units, and training schools.291  The Country Task Force also 
expressed concern about the limited dissemination of the Action Plan.292  The 
task force expressed the necessity that the plan be disseminated to all levels 
of the military to ensure effective implementation of the key commitments of 
the plan.293  
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As of October 2013, two months before the expiration of the Action Plan, 
176 children had been discharged from the Tatmadaw, and sixty-eight of 
those children were released in August 2013.294  At the time of the October 
2013 discharge it remained unclear how many children were serving in the 
Tatmadaw.  According to Steve Marshall, the International Labor 
Organization Myanmar Liaison Officer, “the belief is it’s considerably more 
than the number who have currently been discharged.”295  It has been 
postulated that the number of children released during the term of the Action 
Plan constitute only a fraction of those believed to be to be in the 
Tatmadaw.296   
The eighteen-month time frame stipulated in the Joint Action Plan 
expired in December 2013.  Since the expiration of the Action Plan the 
Tatmadaw has continued to steadily release children from its ranks.297  In 
August 2014 ninety-one children were released from the Tatmadaw.298  On 
September 25, 2013 the Tatmadaw, in the largest discharge since the signing 
of the Action Plan, released 109 children during a ceremony attended by the 
Union Minister for Defense Lieutenant General Wai Lwin.299  Myanmar’s 
government was commended for the September release by Ms. Renata Lok-
Dessallien, the U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Myanmar 
and co-chair of the Country Task Force, who said, “[t]he United Nations 
welcomes today’s release of a further 109 children and young people.  We 
are witnessing an increasing number of children coming out of the 
Tatmadaw, indicating the accelerated efforts of the Government . . . and the 
Tatmadaw to put an end to the harmful practice of recruiting and using 
children.”300  Since the signing of the Action Plan a total of 472 children 
have been released from the Tatmadaw’s ranks.301 
Despite the progress being made by the Tatmadaw the forced recruitment 
of children is still occurring and the exact number of children present in the 
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Government’s armed forces remains unknown.302  Charu Hogg, the Asia 
Program Manager at Child Soldiers International, an independent human 
rights organization, illustrated continued concern notwithstanding the recent 
releases of children soldiers, “recruitment and use of children by the 
Tatmdaw continues to date, despite the signing of the Action Plan.  The 
numbers have been reduced but the practice has not been eliminated.”303  
Until the practice is completely eradicated it is indisputable that the Action 
Plan term will need to be reinstated and extended.  On September 26, 2014, 
the day after the major discharge of children from the Tatmadaw, the U.N. 
Country Task Force and Myanmar’s government were scheduled to meet to 
review the Action Plan.304  At the meeting the two sides were to discuss the 
progress made under the Action Plan and to identify the remaining steps 
needed to end the recruitment and use of children by the Tatmadaw.305  The 
Action Plan provides for the necessary measures to end recruitment, if the 
Plan is reinstated for a longer term and the Government fully commits to 
adhering to the Plan, there would be a realistic hope of ending the practice of 
child soldiering by the Tatmadaw.   
VII.  ATTAINING THE GOAL: THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE JOINT ACTION 
PLAN 
Reinstating the Action Plan and extending its term, albeit a necessary 
step, is only the beginning of achieving the actualization of the Action Plan 
and, in turn, ending the recruitment and use of child soldiers.  The 
Government and the Tatmadaw will have to make considerable efforts to 
implement the commitments contained in the Action Plan.  The U.N. 
Country Task Force stated their concerns regarding barriers to the successful 
implementation of the Action Plan in the Secretary-General’s third report.306  
These concerns echo the remedial measures advocated by many international 
human rights groups.  Charu Hogg, the Asia Program Manager at Child 
Soldiers International, identified five key characteristics that make action 
plans successful: access, demobilization, prevention, accountability, and 
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reintegration.307  These characteristics are likely contained in the substance of 
the Action Plan, but the true understanding and actual implementation of 
these particular measures provide the best road map for the action plan’s 
eventual success. 
Access has been a constant hindrance to the U.N. Country Task Force.  
Without unimpeded access the Country Task Force is unable to carry out its 
most critical role: monitoring and verifying the implementation of the Action 
Plan by the Tatmadaw.  Without access the Country Task Force is left to rely 
solely on reports of the Tatmadaw.  Hogg explained that the ideal scenario 
would be unimpeded access for the Country Task Force without any prior 
notice requirements.308  Although it seems unlikely that this scenario will be 
attained given the actions of the Tatmadaw, the Government should honor 
the commitments set forth in the Action Plan which stipulate that the 
Country Task Force will have access to military bases, prisons, and other 
places where children may be present.309   
Demobilization is obviously the core goal of the Action Plan.  Access is 
required to ensure that goal is obtained and prevention is necessary to ensure 
that the egregious practice does not continue.  Effective prevention of 
underage recruitment begins with the establishment of a reliable system for 
age verification of recruits.310  Verification begins with birth registration; 
Myanmar law advises parents or guardians to register children at birth, when 
they reach the age of ten, and again when they turn eighteen.311  
Unfortunately, birth registration is not a common practice in rural areas.312  
When a child turns ten she is eligible for a National Registration Card, 
although the process of obtaining this documentation is difficult and 
expensive.313  The Government should make the process of birth registration 
easier and more accessible.  The process for obtaining a National 
Registration card should also be more accessible and should only have to be 
done once.  The Government should make the falsification of documents 
more difficult.  With a strengthened age verification system and documents 
that cannot easily be forged, the risk of children without authentic 
documentation or falsified documents would be greatly reduced, and these 
children would no longer be easy prey for recruiters.   
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Another preventive step that should be taken is the professionalization of 
the recruitment process.  Tatmadaw recruiters should receive proper training 
on age verification measures, and a centralized database should be 
established that contains the names, ages, and supporting documentation for 
all recruits.314  The database should also name the recruiting officer 
responsible for the new recruit315 to incentivize proper recruitment and to 
enhance accountability when underage recruitment is detected.  Another, 
broader preventive measure would be the overall professionalization of the 
Tatmadaw.316  Presently there are high desertion rates that put pressure on 
recruitment.  If the Tatmadaw improved pay and conditions, desertion rates 
would likely decrease.317  Additionally, a leaner, more professional army 
would reduce recruitment pressures and in turn eliminate the temptation of 
recruiting children.318 
A key component to ending the cycle of child recruitment is identifying 
those responsible and holding them accountable for their actions.  The 
Secretary-General’s third country report on Myanmar stated that the 
commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw issued a directive on April 20, 2012, 
indicating that action would be taken against those who took part in illegal 
recruitment under the Myanmar Penal Code.319  The Government reported 
increasing numbers of disciplinary actions were taken between 2009 and 
2012.320  These included rank demotion, salary deduction, imprisonment, 
reprimand, pension reduction, and dismissal.321  Yet, the majority of the 
persons disciplined were only reprimanded.322  Disciplinary action must go 
beyond reprimands and reflect the seriousness of the horrendous act of child 
recruitment.  The practice of child recruitment is illegal and punishable under 
the Myanmar Penal Code, but issues arise during the prosecution of the 
offense.  The judicial system in Myanmar must undergo a reform to ensure 
that effective prosecution is taking place.323  Charu Hogg said that, to her 
knowledge, there has been only one case of a civilian broker being 
prosecuted in the court system.324  Thus, the Government should provide a 
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judicial system that is capable of effectively prosecuting those found to 
engage in this activity.  The appropriate disposition for persons convicted 
should include dismissal and imprisonment.  A strong message needs to be 
sent in order to end the cycle of underage recruitment. 
In the process of ending the use and recruitment of children, it is crucial 
not to forget the psychological health of the discharged children.  
Reintegration of discharged child soldiers is necessary for the wellbeing of 
both the child and society.  In October 2002, Carol Bellamy, then UNICEF 
Executive Director, said, “[S]uccessful . . . demobilization programs serve to 
take the guns out of their hands, but we will still be failing these children if 
[we] do not find ways to reunite them with their families and communities 
and provide for their psycho-social care and recovery.”325  During their time 
in the armed forces, children can become asocial326 and traumatized327 by 
their experiences.  A father who believed he had lost his son in Cyclone 
Nargis later found out that his son had been recruited by the Tatmadaw.  
After serving three and a half years in the army, the boy’s father was able to 
lobby for his son’s release.  Since his return, the father said that his son was 
changed, describing the son’s “attitudes and behaviors” as “very rude.”328  
To help children renew positive social relations and productive civilian lives, 
it is preferable to reintegrate children into their families and communities, as 
opposed to utilizing specialized reintegration centers.329  Children also 
should not have to miss out on educational opportunities because of their lost 
years spent in the Tatmadaw.  Flexible educational opportunities should be 
made available to them330 so they can pursue careers of their choice and 
contribute to society.   
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The history of the country now known as Myanmar is riddled with ethnic 
tensions and ingrained with militaristic nationalism.  Both of those pressures 
contribute to the pervasive use of child soldiers in the armed forces.  Recent 
developments, most notably the establishment of a civilian government, have 
inspired optimism in the international community that the country would 
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begin to take steps towards ending the grave violation of the use and 
recruitment of children in the armed forces.331  The Joint Action Plan signed 
in June 2012 between the Government and the U.N. Country Task Force 
symbolized Myanmar’s willingness to reform and illustrated the 
Government’s commitment to not violate the pertinent treaties to which 
Myanmar is a party.332 
The implementation of the Action Plan did not proceed at an ideal 
pace.333  The eighteen-month time frame stipulated in the action plan expired 
in December 2013.334  To achieve the goal of complete demobilization of 
child soldiers, the Action Plan will unquestionably have to be reinstated and 
its time frame extended.   
The key components to the success of the action plan are as follows: 
unrestricted access for the U.N. Country Task Force to areas stipulated in the 
Action Plan; demobilization; prevention; accountability; and reintegration.335  
Based on a reading of the Secretary-General’s 2013 report, these components 
are, to some extent, provided for in the Action Plan.  Demobilization is the 
core goal of the Action Plan; this goal, however, is entirely dependent on the 
Government and Tatmadaw’s adherence and commitment to the components 
laid out above.  Unrestricted access without required prior notice for the U.N. 
Country Task Force will ensure that the effective monitoring and verification 
of the plan’s implementation is taking place.   
Yet, access in itself is not enough.  Preventive measures need to put in 
place to guarantee that the Tatmadaw is sustaining the commitment to non-
recruitment once the Country Task Force is not present.  Such preventive 
measures should be adopted immediately by the Government and the 
Tatmadaw, and should include a centralized recruitment database listing the 
names and ages of recruits, as well as the name of their recruiting officer, 
thus supporting age verification documentation.  The database would 
function more smoothly were the Government to create more accessible birth 
registration and take measures to make the process of falsifying documents 
more difficult.  Naming the recruitment officer in the centralized database 
would enhance accountability measures.  
During the process of demobilization the discharged child soldiers cannot 
be forgotten.  These children are returning to their communities as very 
different people, and must be provided with the resources and support to 
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effectively reintegrate back into their civilian lives.  Discharged children 
should interact with trained professionals who can assist them in re-engaging 
in positive social relations.  Additionally, flexible educational opportunities 
should be made available to allow children to compensate for time lost while 
in the armed forces.336 
Myanmar is at a pivotal point in redressing this grave violation committed 
against children.  The new civilian government has signed onto reform 
efforts, like the Joint Action Plan, and continues to enter ceasefire 
agreements with non-state armed groups.  This progression signals an 
optimistic future for the elimination of the use and recruitment of children 
soldiers, but the goal must be kept in sight.  The Government and the 
Tatmadaw must honor the commitments laid out in the Action Plan to ensure 
the ongoing protection of all of its children.  
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